



NSA review  
completed

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: M5/0031/77

08 FEB 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Proposed DCID No. 1/\_\_\_\_\_, "Security Policy  
Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel  
With Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information" (U)

1. The unanimity of opinion of the representatives of the General Counsels, as stated in \_\_\_\_\_ memorandum of 28 January 1977, significantly clarifies a major point at issue in the development of the proposed DCID. In light of this clarification the Committee now has the dilemma of deciding whether the remaining basic issues are choices that are sufficiently persuasive to recommend to the NFIB and the DCI acceptance of a relaxation of current travel restrictions. The choices are: (a) that the threat of foreign coercion is so patently minimal that the risk is negligible; (b) that the administration of current policy is so cumbersome and burdensome that the existing risk is worth taking. We do not agree in either choice. We feel the Committee is expected to be discriminating in its proposals for safeguarding Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). We would therefore consider approval by the Committee of the proposed DCID, in its present form, to be not only imprudent but an abrogation of its security responsibilities.

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2. We believe it is germane to this action to call to the Committee's attention a Memorandum for the United States Intelligence Board, Subject: Procedures for Foreign Travel of Personnel Possessing Special Security Clearances, dated 1 April 1963, USIB-D-9.6/6. This paper is still an operative document. It was prepared by the Security Committee in coordination with the SIGINT Committee. It was published essentially "to ensure uniform and effective control of travel to denied areas by persons having access to sensitive intelligence in the COMINT, T, K-H and BYEMAN Compartmented Systems". The Memorandum provides procedure for prior approval of official assignment or private travel to denied areas; notes that "Travel in a non-official or private capacity entails considerable risk", and requires a responsible assessment of the risks involved. We believe that it is proper for the Security Committee, in coordination with the SIGINT Committee, to note the existence of


Classified by DISSEA/CHCSB (NSA/CSSM 123-2)  
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this USIB policy document and if it is desired to cancel it, to prepare a logical justification to the NFIB demonstrating that the security premises upon which the Memorandum was originally prepared no longer exist or that the threat has diminished to such a degree that the Board and the DCI need have no concern about the security threat or risk involved in such travel.

3. We do not concur in the proposed DCID attached to your memorandum of 19 January 1977, SECOM-D-216. Our comments and recommended changes are contained in the Inclosure.

  
JAMES E. LEER  
NSA Member

Incl:  
a/s

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